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Summary and Policy Implications
Philip K. Robins
The previous chapters have presented findings from three unem-
ployment insurance (UI) bonus experiments conducted in the United
States during the 1980s.  This chapter summarizes the findings, pro-
vides an assessment of what they seem to imply for the viability of a
national system of UI bonuses, and compares a bonus system to other
possible UI reform measures.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Background of Experiments
The UI bonus experiments were conceived just after unemploy-
ment in the United States had reached a post–World War II high.  In
1982 and 1983, for example, the civilian unemployment rate was
nearly 10 percent (Council of Economic Advisers 1999).  During the
1960s, the unemployment rate averaged under 5 percent and during the
1970s, it averaged just over 6 percent.
High unemployment, coupled with a growing consensus among
academics and policy analysts that the UI program exacerbated unem-
ployment by reducing the incentive to become reemployed, prompted
policymakers to search for alternative ways to help lower unemploy-
ment.  Offering a bonus was a novel idea.  It was thought that a bonus,
if structured properly, could partially offset the financial disincentives
of the UI system and reduce unemployment.
Economic theory provided an unambiguous prediction about the
impact of a bonus on the length of an unemployment spell.  Basic job-
search theory implies that if a time-limited offer of a bonus is extended
to UI recipients, a number of them would respond by finding employ-
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ment more quickly than they would if there had been no bonus.  The
reduced unemployment would be the result of the combined effects of
more intensive job searches and a greater incentive on the part of the
unemployed to accept jobs that are offered (because of a lower reserva-
tion wage).
From the policymaker’s perspective, the source of the reduced
unemployment is important.  If the reduced unemployment comes
about as the result of lower reservation wages, then the bonus may
induce workers to accept lower-paying jobs.  On the other hand, if job-
search intensity increases, workers may find jobs that pay at least as
much as they would in the absence of a bonus offer.
The key policy questions that arose then were 1) by how much
would a bonus reduce unemployment, 2) by how much would the
reduced unemployment lead to lower UI payments, 3) would the
reduced unemployment be associated with lower or higher paying jobs,
4) to what extent would the cost of the bonus be offset by reduced UI
benefits, and 5) would the U.S. economy be better or worse off by the
enactment of a bonus program?
These were critical questions that seemed well suited to being
answered definitively by a carefully conceived and operated social
experiment.  In 1984, the Illinois bonus experiment was launched.  It
was followed in 1988 by the Pennsylvania and Washington bonus
experiments.1
Features and Main Findings
Table 8.1 summarizes the features and main findings from the Illi-
nois, Pennsylvania, and Washington experiments.2  The Illinois experi-
ment tested a single treatment.3  Unemployment insurance recipients
were offered a bonus of $500 if they found a job within 11 weeks of fil-
ing for benefits and if they held the job for at least 4 months.  The
experiment in Pennsylvania tested four treatments.4  Unemployment
insurance recipients were offered bonuses ranging from $105 to $1,596
if they found a job within 6 or 12 weeks of filing for benefits and held
the job for at least 16 weeks.  The experiment in Washington tested six
treatments.  Unemployment insurance recipients were offered bonuses
ranging from $110 to $1,254 if they found a job within 3 to 13 weeks
and held the job for at least 4 months.
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Table 8.1 Summary of Findings from the UI Bonus Experimentsa
Illinois, Pennsylvania, Washington,
1984–1985 1988–1990 1988–1989
Number of sites 22 12 21
Sample size 8,138 12,226 15,534
Treatment 4,186 8,834 12,452
    Control 3,952 3,392 3,082











Number of bonus 
treatments
1 4 6
















Reemployment period 4 months 16 weeks 4 months
Percent leaving UI by 
qualification date
43 57 56
Percent fully qualifying for 
bonus
30 34 31













Average impact on annual 
benefit amountc ($)
–150 –102 –63








 Each bonus experiment had what seemed to be relatively large
sample sizes, ranging from 8,138 in Illinois to 15,534 in Washington.
However, as will be discussed below, unless a “parameterized” model
is used to estimate impacts, the sample sizes in Pennsylvania and
Washington were not really large enough to detect modest differential
impacts among the various bonus treatments.5
The UI programs in the three states provided weekly benefits that
replaced, on average, nearly 40 percent of weekly wages.  The bonuses
represented between two and six times the weekly UI  benefit amount
(WBA).  On the surface, then, the bonuses appeared to have the poten-
tial to provide a significant financial incentive.  However, the bonuses
would have to reduce unemployment by at least 2 to 6 weeks among
those who took up the bonus, otherwise they would not be cost-effec-
tive from the perspective of the UI trust fund.  Because a number of
recipients received “windfall” benefits (that is, they received a bonus
without reducing their unemployment), the reduction in unemployment
among those who responded to the offer would have to be greater than




Net annual benefit per 
claimantd ($)
   Claimant 105 66 –33
   UI system 78 1 –36
   Government 142 24 –57
   Society 247 90 –91
a For impacts, * = statistically significant at the 10% level; ** = statistically significant
at the 5% level.
b Average UI benefit/average wage.
c Taken from Chapter 7, Tables 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4.  For the Pennsylvania and Washington
experiments, values are weighted averages across treatment groups.
d Claimant net benefits are earnings impact minus reduced UI benefits plus bonus pay-
ment minus estimated taxes.  UI system net benefits are reduced UI benefit minus
bonus payment minus administrative cost of bonus program.  Government net bene-
fits are UI system net benefits plus increased taxes.  Society benefits are earnings
impact minus administrative cost of bonus program.  Administrative cost is assumed
to be $3 per claimant and taxes are assumed to be 25% of earnings impact.
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As Table 8.1 indicates, between 43 and 57 percent of the treatment
group members left UI by the qualification date and, of those, between
half and three-quarters fully qualified for the bonus.  However, the pro-
portion of claimants receiving bonuses was very low in all three exper-
iments, ranging from 11 to 15 percent of eligible treatment group
members.  Surprisingly, almost half of those who fully qualified for the
bonus failed to claim it.  In Illinois, roughly three-quarters of those that
fully qualified for the bonus claimed it, while in Washington and Penn-
sylvania approximately one-half of those fully eligible for the bonus
claimed it.  Such a large number of “no-shows” increases the cost-
effectiveness of the bonus, but the take-up rate by eligible claimants in
a full-scale national program would probably be higher than that expe-
rienced in the experiment.  The administrators of the experiments have
not provided any explanation why so many individuals failed to claim
the bonus.  Certainly the transaction costs involved in filing a claim
would appear to be low relative to the payoff.
Although in some sense each of the 11 treatments in the 3 experi-
ments can be viewed as independent programs, the average experimen-
tal effect in each experiment can be loosely considered the result of a
treatment that is the weighted average of the bonus offers and qualifica-
tion periods in each experiment.  For the most part, it is this “average
treatment” that will be the major focus of attention in what follows.
Each experiment significantly reduced the number of weeks claim-
ants received UI benefits, with Illinois having the largest impact of just
over one week and Pennsylvania and Washington reducing UI benefit
receipt by close to one-half week.  If the Federal Supplemental Com-
pensation (FSC-eligible) treatment group is excluded from the Illinois
calculations, the reductions in UI receipt become similar across all
experiments, ranging from 0.40 week in Washington to 0.65 week in
Illinois.  Although it is not entirely clear why those eligible for FSC
benefits would be more likely to respond to the bonus, one explanation
is presented in Chapter 6 (see p. 199).  In short, because FSC-eligibility
reduces search effort, the marginal cost of increased search is lower,
and the bonus can have an increased impact.
The Pennsylvania and Washington experiments tested more than
one treatment in order to measure the sensitivity of the impact to the
bonus amount.  The Pennsylvania experiment tested two bonus
amounts and two qualification periods.  The Washington experiment
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Figure 8.1 Results of the Washington and Pennsylvania Experiments
tested three bonus amounts and two qualification periods.  Figure 8.1
shows the relationship between the bonus amount in each experiment
and the impact on UI benefits for each qualification period.  This figure
indicates that only in the case of the short qualification period in the
Washington experiment and the long qualification period in the Penn-
sylvania experiment does their appear to be a pattern of increasing neg-
ative impact on UI benefit amount with the size of the bonus.  How-
ever, with the exception of the short qualification period in the Wash-
ington experiment, the differences in impacts across treatments are not
generally very large and are not statistically significant.  Thus, one
must conclude that the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments
were not very successful in measuring the sensitivity of the impact to
the bonus amount.
Because so few members of the treatment group received a bonus,
the bonus amount per treatment group member averaged only $68 in
Illinois, $98 in Pennsylvania, and $95 in Washington.  The average
reduction in UI benefits exceeded the average bonuses (including
administrative costs) in Illinois and equaled the average bonus in Penn-
sylvania, making the bonus cost-effective from the perspective of the
UI trust fund in Illinois and cost-neutral in Pennsylvania.  Only the
Washington experiment was not cost-effective from the perspective of
the UI trust fund.
While seemingly cost-effective in Illinois, a higher take-up rate
would have reversed this conclusion.  As indicated above, it is not
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known why the take-up rate was so low in Illinois (as well as in the
other two experiments).  If bonuses are to remain a serious policy alter-
native, future research needs to investigate and understand the reasons
for the low take-up rate.
In addition to reducing UI benefits, the bonuses also increased
earnings in Illinois and Pennsylvania, but they decreased earnings in
Washington.  Because there was no significant change in the probabil-
ity of being employed in any of the experiments, the increased earnings
in Illinois and Pennsylvania implies that the claimants were probably
not taking lower paying jobs in order to receive the bonus.  Wage rates
may have been somewhat reduced in Washington.
In Illinois and Pennsylvania, the claimants experienced net benefits
from the program.  The net benefits arose because of both the bonus
payments plus the increased earnings (net of taxes).  In Washington,
the net benefits to claimants were slightly negative because earnings
and UI benefits fell by more than the bonus payments.
The Illinois and Pennsylvania experiments also conferred net bene-
fits on society.  The positive net societal benefits arose because of the
increased earnings.  Because the Washington experiment decreased
claimant earnings, net benefits to society were negative.
Generalizing the Experimental Findings
Chapter 6 described three major concerns that arise in generalizing
the experimental findings to a national program.  First, there is the pos-
sibility that the availability of a bonus would induce more individuals
to apply for UI benefits.  At the time of the experiments, approximately
65 percent of those eligible for UI were applying for benefits.  It would
seem likely that the percentage of eligible persons that apply for UI
would be greater under a national program.  Second, as has been indi-
cated, the take-up rate among persons that were fully eligible for a
bonus was only about 50 percent.  Again, it is likely that the take-up
rate would be higher under a national program, perhaps because of
greater information about the bonuses, less stigma attached to receiv-
ing them, and belief in the credibility of the issuing agent.  Finally,
there is the possibility that bonus recipients would “crowd out” other
workers from jobs that the others would have taken.
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Accounting for each of these concerns affects the net benefits of
the program.  In some cases, net benefits increase, while in others they
decrease.  Table 8.2 shows how net benefits change from each of the
four perspectives (claimant, UI system, government, and society), after
accounting for these concerns.  The first row of Table 8.2 shows the net
benefits under a hypothetical program having a bonus of $500, a quali-
fication period of six weeks, a UI take-up rate of 65 percent, a bonus
take-up rate of 50 percent, and no crowding out.  These conditions
approximate the average conditions prevailing in the three UI experi-
ments.  Under these conditions, net benefits from all four perspectives
are positive.
Increasing the UI take-up rate to 75 percent increases the net bene-
fits to the claimant but decreases the net benefits to the UI system and
the government, making them negative.  Because there is no change in
real output, net benefits to society only change slightly due to higher
administrative costs.  Increasing the bonus take-up rate further in-
creases the net benefits to the claimants and further decreases the net
benefits to the UI system and the government.  Finally, allowing for a
crowding-out ratio of 40 percent reduces net benefits from all perspec-
tives except the UI system.
Of course, it is not known with certainty whether these changes,
which were estimated using a simulation model, would occur under a
Table 8.2 Net Annual Benefits per Claimant under a Hypothetical 
National Program ($) 
Parameter Claimant UI system Government Society
Base programa 32 21 40 72
Increase UI take-up rate 
to 75%
78 –26 7 71
Increase bonus take-up 
rate to 75%
96 –40 –25 71
Increase crowding-out 
ratio to 0.40
68 –44 –35 34
NOTE: Taken from results from the Pooled Experimental Samples in Chapter 7, except
for claimant benefit calculation.  Each successive row represents a change from the
previous row.
a Bonus = $500, qualification period = 6 weeks, UI take-up rate = 65%, bonus take-up
rate = 50%, crowding out ratio = 0.
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national program.  Nonetheless, the experimental findings strongly
suggest that a national bonus program similar to the ones tested in the
three UI experiments would not be cost-effective from the perspectives
of the UI Trust Fund or the government.  However, claimants and soci-
ety are predicted to experience net benefits from the program, even
after accounting for “macro-effects.”
ASSESSING THE EXPERIMENTS
There are at least two ways in which to assess the UI experiments.
First, one needs to determine whether they achieved their objective of
providing definitive information about the impacts of a UI bonus sys-
tem.  Second, if the impacts are judged as definitive, one needs to form
a conclusion about whether bonuses are a good idea for national policy.
Regardless of whether or not they are a good idea for national policy,
the experiments may be judged as successful if they provided definitive
answers to the questions originally posed.
From the standpoint of standards for social policy research, the
experiments were quite successful.  As described in Chapter 2, the
experiments were generally carried out as originally designed and the
use of randomized treatments ensured that the results had internal
validity.  Furthermore, the findings were generally consistent across the
experiments; however, there were some differences in the findings that
might limit their generalizability.  UI benefits were significantly
decreased in all three experiments by similar amounts, but average
earnings rose in Illinois and Pennsylvania and fell in Washington
(although the Pennsylvania and Washington earnings impacts were not
statistically significant).  None of the experiments significantly affected
employment, although the estimated impact was positive in Illinois,
negative in Pennsylvania, and zero in Washington.  Overall, however,
the differences across experiments were not large enough to be statisti-
cally significant.  Financial incentives appeared to work the way econ-
omists and policy analysts predicted they would, but the impacts were
not nearly as large as advocates of a bonus would have hoped for.
In addition to some inconsistencies across the experiments, they
were also not entirely successful in pinpointing the differential impacts
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of alternative program features, such as the size of the bonus and the
length of the qualification period.  Given the success of the Illinois
experiment (which tested only a single bonus treatment), the Pennsyl-
vania and Washington experiments were designed to confirm the Illi-
nois results and to provide estimates of the sensitivity of impacts to
various program features.  The Pennsylvania experiment tested four
treatments and the Washington experiment tested six treatments, both
varying the size of the bonus offer and the length of the qualification
period.6
Within each experiment, there were no statistically significant dif-
ferences across treatments.  In a continuous variable model in which
weeks of UI was regressed on the bonus amount and the length of the
qualification period (plus other control variables), the estimated
impacts were not statistically significant at conventional levels,
although both were of the expected negative sign (see Chapter 4, Table
4.3).  When the Pennsylvania and Washington samples were pooled,
the impact of the bonus amount was statistically significant at the 10
percent level.  When all three experimental samples were pooled, the
length of the qualification period became statistically significant at the
5 percent level, but the impact of the bonus amount was not statistically
significant.
What can the lack of significant differences across treatments be
attributed to?  It appears that the sample sizes were not large enough to
detect differences of the order of magnitude that actually occurred.  Of
course, it could not have been known beforehand what the impacts
would turn out to be, but it appears not enough attention was paid to
identifying differential impacts across treatments.  In retrospect, it
might have been better to have tested fewer treatments in Pennsylvania
and Washington, with greater differences in bonus amounts and qualifi-
cation periods to have possibly generated larger differential impacts.
However, parameterizing the bonus and qualification options was
always considered an acceptable alternative format that generally
requires smaller sample sizes across treatments, although functional
form in a parameterized model is an important issue that needs to be
resolved before determining sample size requirements.
Despite these shortcomings, the experimental approach appears to
have generated credible and definitive findings relative to other evalua-
tion methods.  As noted by Linkz (1999), policymakers were generally
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convinced by the experimental findings, found them simple to compre-
hend, and concluded that the experimental design was the only one that
would have produced credible results.  The only real limitation of the
experimental approach was that it took some time for the results to be
generated and disseminated and by the time they became available (the
late 1980s and early 1990s), the policy agenda had changed somewhat,
with welfare reform overshadowing UI reform and fiscal conservatism
gripping Congress.  By the time the results became fully available, UI
bonuses had become a much less feasible policy option.  Worker profil-
ing had taken center stage as the policy of choice, and the experiments
did not provide any direct evidence on how worker profiling would
work with a system of bonuses (although, as I indicate below, more
recent work has used the experimental data to simulate the effects of
worker profiling in a system with bonuses).
ALTERNATIVE POLICIES
The results presented in this book have suggested that the UI bonus
schemes tested in the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington experi-
ments were only marginally cost-effective from the perspective of the
UI Trust Fund and the overall government budget.  If a relatively unre-
stricted bonus scheme does not achieve the kinds of objectives that
were originally hoped for, the natural question arises as to whether
there are alternative policies for encouraging reemployment among UI
recipients that may be more cost-effective.  In this section, I discuss
five alternatives that have been proposed since the UI bonus experi-
ments were undertaken.  Three of these—an earnings supplement,
stricter sanctioning of work-search requirements, and stricter work-
search requirements—have also been evaluated using a randomized
experiment.  The other two—worker profiling and Unemployment




One alternative to bonuses is to provide an earnings supplement to
UI recipients who are willing to take a pay cut to become reemployed
more quickly.  The objective of a UI supplement scheme is to cushion
any income losses suffered as a result of the pay cut.  In order to mini-
mize windfall, the supplements should be provided only to individuals
who would otherwise not have become reemployed.  Displaced work-
ers (persons who have lost stable, long-term, and often well-paying
jobs due to technology, increased international competition, or shifting
market demand) and repeat users of UI are groups for whom an earn-
ings supplement might be effective.
Permanent job displacement is a problem throughout North Amer-
ica and Europe.7  In Canada, between 1981 and 1991, more than one
million persons were permanently laid off from jobs.  Unemployment
insurance in Canada (now officially referred to as Employment Insur-
ance) is the largest source of government assistance to displaced work-
ers.  The UI system in Canada is more generous than it is in the United
States.  It replaces close to 55 percent of wages for most workers and
pays benefits for up to 50 weeks.  As in the United States, much has
been written about the potential for the Canadian UI system to prolong
unemployment.  Because of this, and because of the high cost of the UI
program in Canada, policymakers there have been exploring new kinds
of reemployment policies.
Given the limited success of the UI bonus experiments, Canadian
policymakers were reluctant to test a similar kind of program.  Instead,
they proposed and tested an alternative—an earnings supplement.  An
earnings supplement is designed to make up part of the earnings loss
suffered by displaced workers who are able to find reemployment more
quickly but at wages lower than what they had previously experienced.
In 1995, the Canadian government funded an experimental evaluation
of an earnings supplement program for displaced workers and repeat
users receiving UI.  The experimental program, termed the Earnings
Supplement Project (ESP), was carried out on close to 6,000 persons
(half of which were assigned to a control group and half to a treatment
group) in five Canadian cities.8
The features and findings of the ESP are presented in Table 8.3.9
To be eligible for the supplement, UI recipients had to find a full-time
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job (30 hours or more of work per week) within 6 months of filing for
UI benefits.  This job could not be with their most recent employer at
their previous work location.  If an eligible job were found, the individ-
ual could receive a weekly payment equal to 75 percent of the differ-
ence between the previously weekly insurable wage and the new wage,
with a maximum supplement equal to Can$250 per week.10  Thus, if
the individual found a job that payed the same, or more, than the previ-
ous job no supplement would be paid.
Individuals were eligible for the supplement for up to two years.
Unlike the U.S. bonus experiments, there was no required preemploy-
ment period—individuals became eligible to receive the supplement
immediately after finding a full-time job.
As Table 8.3 indicates, the average supplement recipient was paid
more than Can$8,700, averaging about Can$137 per week.  Like the
proportion of the treatment group collecting a bonus in the U.S. exper-
iments, however, the proportion of the ESP treatment group receiving a
supplement was extremely low—only 21 percent of the treatment
group received the supplement (compared with between 11 and 15 per-
cent of the treatment group that received a bonus in the U.S. experi-
ments).11  The percentage leaving UI by the qualification date (26
weeks after filing for UI benefits) was similar to the percentage in the
U.S. experiments (48 percent compared with between 43 and 57 per-
cent) and the percentages fully qualifying for the supplement were also
similar (28 percent compared with between 30 and 34 percent).  Fur-
thermore, unlike the U.S. bonus experiments, the ESP supplement had
no perceivable impact on UI receipt.  In fact, the treatment group actu-
ally stayed on UI slightly longer and received slightly more UI than the
control group.  Although the treatment group had a 0.023 higher
employment rate than the control group (similar to the impact in the
Illinois bonus experiment), average earnings were lower, although not
significantly so.  Thus, unlike the U.S. bonus experiments, some ESP
recipients were induced to find lower paying jobs and overall employ-
ment was not increased by enough to result in an overall increase in
average earnings during the first five quarters of the program.
Because of the lack of an impact on UI benefit receipt, ESP was
not cost-effective from the perspective of either the UI system or the
government.  Additionally, because claimant earnings fell, ESP had
negative net benefits for society.  Only claimants benefited from the
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Table 8.3 Summary of Findings from the Canadian UI Earnings 
Supplement Project (ESP) Experimenta
Years operated 1995–1997
Number of sites 5
Sample size 5,912
    Treatment 2,960
    Control 2,952
Average weekly UI benefit (Can$) 308
Average UI replacement rateb (%) 55
Number of treatments 1
Weekly supplement $250 or 75% of lost 
earnings, whichever 
is less
Maximum number of weeks supplement could be paid 104
Average supplement paid over 104 weeks (Can$) 8,705
Average number of weeks supplement was paid 64 
Average weekly supplement (Can$) 137
Qualification period to get full-time job (≥30 hours) 26 weeks
Reemployment period none required
Percent leaving UI by qualification date 48
Percent employed full-time by qualification date 42
Percent qualifying for supplement 28
Percent receiving supplement 21
Average impact on UI benefit weeks, quarters 1–2 0.2
Average impact on UI benefit amount, quarters 1–5 
(Can$)
90
Average supplement paid, quarters 1–5 (Can$) 1,165
Impact on probability of employment, quarters 1–2 0.023*
Impact on earnings, quarters 1–5 (Can$) –682
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Table 8.3 (continued)
SOURCE: Adapted from Bloom et al. (1999).
a For impacts, * = statistically significant at the 10% level.
b Weekly UI benefit / weekly wage.
c Based on Tables 7.1 and 7.4 of Bloom et al. (1999).  Claimant net benefits are earn-
ings impact plus plus UI benefit impact plus supplement payment minus estimated
tax change.  UI system net benefits are minus UI benefit impact minus supplement
payment minus administrative cost of supplement program.  Government net benefits
are UI system net benefits plus estimated tax change.  Society benefits are earnings
impact minus administrative cost of supplement program.  Administrative cost is $89
per claimant over quarters 1–5 and taxes are assumed to be 25% of earnings impact.
program, but by less than their supplement payments (because of the
decreased earnings).  Hence, ESP served primarily to transfer income
from taxpayers to UI recipients, but not in a cost-effective manner.
From the perspective of public policy, an earnings supplement that par-
tially replaces lost earnings appears to be much more costly and much
less effective than a one-time bonus.
Stricter Sanctioning
In recent years, U.S. social policy has been increasingly using
sanctions, rather than financial incentives, to promote work effort.
Sanctioning consists of penalizing recipients who do not comply with
program regulations.  The greater emphasis on sanctioning has been a
response to claims that recipients of social transfers are abusing the
system.
In the UI program, sanctioning takes the form of reducing benefits
(possibly to zero) for persons who do not comply with the work-search
requirements.  Surprisingly, little is known about the impacts of stricter
sanctioning in the UI program.  Recently, Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and
Deschênes (2000) reported the results of four randomized experiments
that took place during the mid 1980s and tested the effects of stricter
enforcement and verification of work-search requirements in the UI
program.12
The UI sanctioning experiments contained several treatments.  One
treatment gave claimants an expanded initial eligibility questionnaire
and emphasized the UI work requirement, including being notified that
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work search is subject to verification and that the claimant might be
disqualified if the requirement wasn’t being met.  In addition, at the ini-
tial visit to the UI office, the claimant completed a work history form
which was used later to review the accuracy of the monetary determi-
nation of eligibility.  A portion of claimants receiving the first treatment
was given a second treatment consisting of an actual verification of job
contacts.  The evaluators compared claimants receiving the second
treatment with those in the treatment group that were not subject to the
verification procedures to infer the impact of the verification proce-
dures.
Table 8.4 presents the results of the experimental evaluation.  In no
case did the verification procedure significantly affect qualification
rates or UI recipiency rates or benefit amounts.13  The authors con-
cluded that sanctions are not cost-effective.
Stricter Work Search Requirements
In contrast to stricter sanctioning of existing work-search require-
ments, another possible UI policy would be to increase the work-search
requirements themselves.  In 1986, an experiment was undertaken in
Tacoma, Washington, that tested several treatments of differing work-
search requirements.  The design and findings from this experiment are
reported in Johnson and Klepinger (1994).
The Tacoma experiment had four treatments, as indicated in Table
8.5.  Treatment A eliminated the work-search requirements entirely.
Treatment B had the standard work-search requirements and, hence,
served as the control group for the experiment.  Treatment C provided
individualized requirements, by tailoring them to individual circum-
stances, and increased the requirements and provided services for
claimants who didn’t find work within a reasonable period of time.
Treatment D combined intensive job-search assistance with employ-
ability development planning.
Prior to the experiment, members of each treatment group had sim-
ilar characteristics.  They received, on average, a weekly UI benefit of
about $146, which replaced about 63 percent of their pre-UI earnings.
Impacts of the experiment are also presented in Table 8.5.  As indi-
cated by the relative impacts of treatment A, the results strongly sug-
gest that existing work-search requirements reduce UI benefits paid,
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weeks receiving UI benefits, and the percent exhausting benefits, but
have no impact on employment or earnings (the lack of a negative
impact on earnings may be viewed as a positive finding because it
implies that work-search requirements lead to a greater intensity of
search rather than a reduction in the reservation wage).
 Increasing work-search requirements beyond their present levels,
however, had only a modest impact.  Treatment C had no significant
impact on any of the UI outcomes and only modestly increases the
employment rate by 1.7 percentage points.  Treatment D reduced
weeks of UI receipt by about one-half week and had no impact on earn-
ings.  Johnson and Klepinger indicated that Treatment D is cost-effec-
Table 8.4 Summary of Findings from U.S. UI Sanctioning Experiments
Years operated 1984–1985
Number of sites 4
Sample size 3,877
    Treatmenta 1,966
    Control 1,921
Average weekly UI benefit entitlementb ($) 116
Average replacement ratec (%) 51
Impact of work search verification ond
Temporary disqualification rate 0.007
Average weekly benefits 0.85
Observed claim duration (weeks) –0.23
SOURCE: Data from Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Deschênes (2000).
a There were two treatment groups.  Members of the first treatment group had their
work search verified in addition to a number of other verifications of initial and con-
tinuing eligibility, while members of the second treatment group were subjected to
the additional verifications of eligibility but not the verification of work-search verifi-
cation.  The authors used differences between the two treatment groups to isolate the
impact of the work-search verification component.
b Measured over the treatment and control groups.
c In three of the four sites for which earnings data were available.  The rate equals the
average UI benefit entitlement/average earnings.
d Derived from a comparison of mean outcomes of the first treatment group with the
second treatment group.  None of the impacts are statistically significant at the 10%
level or lower.
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Sample size 2,246 1,964 2,533 2,871
Average weekly UI benefit ($) 147 145 147 145
Average replacement ratec (%) 63 63 63 63
Services received 
(% of sample)
Eligibility review interview 0.4 24.6 33.2 19.3
Job-search workshop 0.0 0.1 0.1 15.2
Job referral 14.8 17.9 16.9 15.7
Job placement 5.7 6.8 7.2 6.0
Job counseling 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.6
Impact relative to status quo 
(Treatment B)d
Total UI benefits paid ($) 265** – 5 –68
Weeks of UI benefits 
received
3.34** – 0.17 –0.47*
Percent exhausting benefits 12.5** – 0.5 –0.3
Percent employed –0.9 – 1.7*** 1.3
Hours of work –6 – 2 22
Hourly wage ratee 0.12 – –0.13 –0.01
Total earnings ($) –23 – –24 292
SOURCE: Data from Johnson and Klepinger (1994).
a * = Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5%
level; *** = statistically significant at the 1% level.
b Treatment A: no work-search requirement;
Treatment B: status quo (at least three contacts per week);
Treatment C: Individualized requirements, Varying contracts per week (up to five); 
Treatment D: Intensive job-search assistance and employability development plan-
ning.
c Average UI benefit/average earnings.
d Impacts are regression-adjusted.  For UI variables, the impact is measured over the
full benefit year.  For the employment and earnings variables, the impacts are mea-
sured over the full two years after applying for benefits.
e Hourly wage rate impacts are selectivity-corrected.
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tive, but this inference is based on a statistically insignificant reduction
of $68 in UI benefits paid.
Worker Profiling
Since the mid 1990s, in response to congressional legislation,
states have been implementing Worker Profiling and Reemployment
Services (WPRS) systems (see, e.g., Eberts and O’Leary 1996).  These
systems actively help UI recipients shorten time out of work by identi-
fying UI recipients who are most likely to exhaust benefits and refer-
ring them to required reemployment services.
Under the WPRS, UI recipients most likely to exhaust benefits are
identified using a statistical methodology that assigns a probability of
exhaustion to each UI recipient eligible for profiling.  The probabilities
are derived from a regression model that links the effects of personal
characteristics and economic factors to the probability of exhaustion.
O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (1997) argued that worker profiling
can be used in a bonus program to potentially improve net benefits to
the UI system.  By restricting bonuses to claimants most likely to
exhaust benefits, they maintain that windfall bonuses will be lower and
impacts on UI benefit receipt rates and benefit amounts will be higher.
Although there is no experimental evidence demonstrating that there
would be an improvement in net benefits under a UI bonus program
with worker profiling, O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner simulated the
effects of worker profiling in the Pennsylvania and Washington UI
bonus experiments.
A summary of their simulation results is presented in Table 8.6.
They examine two types of profiling schemes.  One would limit bene-
fits to the top 50 percent of claimants most likely to exhaust benefits.
The other would limit benefits to the top 25 percent of claimants most
likely to exhaust benefits.  In both cases, UI benefits were reduced by
more in the profiled group.  In addition, despite higher bonus amounts
for the profiled group, net benefits to the UI system were higher.  Per-
haps surprisingly, the more restrictive profiling scheme (those limiting
the bonus to the top 25 percent of claimants most likely to exhaust ben-
efits) yielded lower net benefits than the less restrictive profiling
scheme (those limiting the bonus to the top 50 percent of claimants
most likely to exhaust benefits).   However, the differences between the
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two types of profiling schemes were small and the differences between
profiled and nonprofiled claimants in either scheme were not statisti-
cally significant.  The authors concluded that a low bonus amount (per-
haps three times the WBA) and a long qualification period (perhaps 12
weeks) targeted to the top half of claimants most likely to exhaust UI
benefits would be the most cost-effective type of bonus profiling
scheme.  They estimated that such a scheme would save the UI Trust
Fund about $50 per offer. 
While profiling appears to make a bonus program more cost-effec-
tive, the improvement is minimal.  Moreover, the existing results on
Table 8.6 Simulated Net Benefits under Worker Profiling,
Pennsylvania and Washington UI Experimentsa ($)
Variable Pennsylvania Washington
Impact on UI benefits paidb
Bottom 50% –70 31
Top 50% –172* –117*
Difference –102 –148
Bottom 75% –109 13
Top 25% –129 –118
Difference –20 –131
Average bonus paid
Bottom 50% 86 67
Top 50% 103 142
Difference 17 75
Bottom 75% 92 85
Top 25% 104 166
Difference 12 81
Net benefit per claimant from 
perspective of UI system
No worker profiling –13 –76
Worker profiling, top 50% 36 –28
Worker profiling, top 25% –8 –51
SOURCE: Data from O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (1997).
a * = Statistically significant at the 10% level.
b For combined treatments using the authors’ profiling models.
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profiled bonuses are based on nonexperimental simulations and may
not occur under an actual program.  In addition, the statistical models
used to predict exhaustion rates tend to have low explanatory power
and may not be accurately defining the optimal target group.  Finally,
in the presence of profiling, it is possible that claimants will alter their
behavior to be more likely to meet the criteria used to select bonus-eli-
gible claimants.  If this occurs, the profiling procedure will become an
even less accurate tool for identifying the group least likely to be
receiving windfall benefits from a bonus program.
Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts
A more radical proposal to encourage reemployment among UI
recipients is the use of Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts
(UISA).  As proposed by Feldstein and Altman (1998), all working per-
sons would be required to save a fraction of their wages (up to 4 per-
cent) in special government accounts.  The funds in these accounts
would earn the market rate of interest and could be drawn upon if the
people were to become unemployed.  In the event that the funds are
exhausted, the government would lend these people money, again at
the market rate of interest.  If the person retires or dies with a positive
balance in the account, it would be converted into retirement income or
bequeathed to heirs.  Negative balances would be forgiven.
By using personal wealth to subsidize unemployment, Feldstein
and Altman argued that reemployment would be encouraged.  Only
persons who expect to retire or die with negative balances would face
the same adverse reemployment incentives as under the present UI sys-
tem.
Using historical data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
Feldstein and Altman simulated the performance of such a system.
They found that only 5 percent of employees would retire or die with
negative balances.  They also estimated that UISAs would save the UI
trust fund about half the benefits being paid under the current system.
They suggest the savings could be used to reduce payroll taxes.
While such a system has intuitive appeal, about half the benefits
would be paid to individuals with negative balances at retirement.  This
raises serious questions regarding the equity of such a system, although
the current system also raises questions of equity.  Furthermore, it is
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possible that the percentage of persons with negative balances at retire-
ment could be even larger than suggested by the historical data, if there
are adverse behavioral impacts (people borrowing money by increasing
unemployment to build up negative balances at retirement).  Without
an actual field test of system of UISAs, it is difficult to draw any firm
conclusions about its likely impacts.
CONCLUSIONS
The UI bonus experiments achieved their objective of providing
credible estimates of the likely impacts of a UI bonus system.  The
experimental results indicate that bonuses are unlikely to have major
impacts on unemployment and may only be marginally cost-effective.
The results are generally consistent across the experiments,
although the magnitude of impacts varied.  Impacts on benefit weeks
were remarkably similar across the experiments (ranging from –0.40 to
–0.65 week, excluding the FSC sample in Illinois), but the impacts on
earnings were quite different (ranging from $250 in Illinois to –$88 in
Washington).  The Illinois experiment had the most positive impacts,
leading to positive net benefits on all segments of society.  The Penn-
sylvania experiment also yielded positive net benefits, but they were
smaller than in Illinois.  The Washington experiment yielded negative
net benefits on all segments of society, although a few positive results
did emerge for specific treatments.  Despite the general similarity
across experiments in average bonus amounts and qualification peri-
ods, the differences in net benefits across experiments are somewhat
perplexing.  Davidson and Woodbury hypothesize in Chapter 6 that dif-
ferences in macroeconomic conditions across the three experimental
sites (namely differences in job separation rates and growth rates in
available jobs) could be responsible for the differences in net benefits
across the sites. 
The Illinois experiment had only one treatment and was not
designed to test the sensitivity of responses to different treatment lev-
els.  The Pennsylvania and Washington experiments had several treat-
ments and were specifically designed to test the sensitivity of responses
to different treatment levels.  However, the Pennsylvania and Washing-
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ton experiments were not entirely successful in measuring the sensitiv-
ity of responses to different treatment levels.  While the sample sizes
for the entire experiments were adequate to measure experimental-con-
trol differences, the sample sizes for the individual treatments were
probably not large enough to measure moderate differences in response
across treatments.
Nonetheless, the evidence appears conclusive that bonuses are not
the panacea originally envisioned.  Allowing for macro effects that
could not be measured by the experiments (higher UI take-up rate,
higher bonus take-up rate, and crowding out) makes the evidence even
less supportive of the bonus option.
Alternatives to bonuses have been proposed, but none appears to
yield more desirable effects.  Earnings supplements, tighter sanction-
ing, and increasing work-search requirements beyond their present lev-
els all appear to be ineffective reforms.  While some have suggested
that worker profiling would improve net benefits, the evidence so far
suggests that it is unlikely profiling would lead to consistently positive
net benefits, although subsequent refinement of this technique may
yield more positive results.  However, the ability to identify key target
groups is a difficult problem limiting the development of effective pro-
filing models.  Finally, the impacts of more radical reforms such as
Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts are largely speculative
and may prove so inequitable that they would not be politically palat-
able.
The search for reform in the UI system is not as intense today as it
has been in the past, largely because the economy has been healthy and
unemployment has been much lower.  Nonetheless, the search contin-
ues because the adverse work incentives still exist within the system
and the economy might worsen in the future.  As new approaches are
developed, the evidence from this book strongly suggests that if at all
possible, randomized experimental evaluations of such approaches
should be undertaken.  I believe randomized experiments provide the
most effective way of gathering definitive evidence about the likely
effects of a particular programmatic change and should be favored over
non-experimental evaluation techniques.  However, the worst possible




1. There was a fourth UI bonus experiment conducted in New Jersey in 1986 and
1987.  The New Jersey experiment had three treatments: job-search assistance,
job-search assistance plus training or relocation, and job-search assistance plus a
reemployment bonus.  The New Jersey experiment is not considered in this book
because the bonus offers were made only after seven weeks of insured unemploy-
ment, and hence could not be replicated in a real national program where informa-
tion about the bonus would be available from the beginning of an insured
unemployment spell.  For details about the New Jersey experiment and its results,
see U.S. Department of Labor (1989) and Meyer (1995).
2. The dollar amounts reported in Table 8.1 and subsequent tables pertain to the
years in which the studies were conducted.  If the reader wishes to convert the
study year amounts to present-day dollars (say, for the year 2000), the study year
amounts would be multiplied by the ratio of a price index in the year 2000 to the
price index in the study year.  If the study was conducted over more than one year,
an average price index over the study years may be used as an approximation.
One commonly used price index is the Consumer Price Index, or CPI.  For exam-
ple, in the case of the Illinois experiment, the study period was 1984 to 1985.  The
CPI for the year 2000 (1982–1984 = 100) was 172.2.  The average CPI over the
years 1984 to 1985 was 105.7.  Thus the average weekly UI benefit in Illinois of
$135 reported in Table 8.1 would be the equivalent of $200 in year-2000 dollars
($135 × 172.2/105.7).  To convert Pennsylvania and Washington dollar amounts to
year-2000 dollars, one would use the year 2000 CPI and the average CPI in Penn-
sylvania over the years 1988 to 1990 (which was 124.3) and the average CPI in
Washington over the years 1988 to 1989 (which was 121.2).  Similar calculations
can be made for the other dollar amounts reported in this chapter.
3. As has been noted, Illinois also had a second experiment where bonuses were
offered to employers, but extremely low participation precluded it from having
any significant impacts.  The employer experiment was not considered in this
book because it differed from the experiments in Pennsylvania and Washington.
4. More than one treatment was tested in the Pennsylvania and Washington experi-
ments because the success of the Illinois experiment encouraged policymakers to
seek ways of finding the most cost-effective structure for a national bonus pro-
gram.  The Pennsylvania experiment tested a declining bonus offer (like in the
New Jersey experiment) but, because it cannot be easily compared to a fixed
bonus offer, it is not considered in this book.
5. The sample sizes for the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments were not
determined on the basis of measuring differential impacts among the various
treatments but rather were determined on the basis of measuring treatment-control
impacts.  By a parameterized model, it is meant that a response surface is esti-
mated in which the treatments are quantified into a small number of continuous
variables (like bonus amount or qualification period) rather than by a series of dis-
crete dummy variables representing treatments.  Thus, it was implicitly assumed
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by the designers of the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments that differential
impacts among the treatments would be estimated using a parsimonious response
surface model.  See, for example, Table 4.3 in Chapter 4.
6. There was no attempt to vary the preemployment period, which was set at four
months in all three experiments.
7. See Lauzon (1995) for a discussion of the problem in Canada, Ross and Smith
(1993) for a discussion of the problem in the United States, and OECD (1990) for
a discussion of the problem in Europe.
8. The five cities were Saskatoon, Saskatchewan; Granby, Quebec; Winnipeg, Mani-
toba; Oshawa, Ontario; and Toronto, Ontario.
9. The information in this table was taken from Bloom et al. (1999).  It only pertains
to the program for displaced workers.
10. At an exchange rate of 0.75 Canadian dollars per U.S. dollar, the maximum sup-
plement in U.S. dollars would be about $187.50.
11. The low percentage of treatment group members receiving a supplement in ESP
may be due to the fact that UI recipients are unwilling to jeopardize long-run job
prospects by taking a short-term lower-paying job.  By taking a lower-paying job,
claimants would have to reduce job-search behavior and might miss out on find-
ing a new job more comparable to the predisplacement job.
12. The four experiments took place in Hartford, Connecticut; Worcester, Massachu-
setts; Nashville, Tennessee; and Falls Church, Virginia.
13. Other components of the treatment also did not have statistically significant
impacts.
References
Ashenfelter, Orley, David Ashmore, and Olivier Deschênes.  2000.   “Do
Unemployment Insurance Recipients Actively Seek Work?  Evidence from
Randomized Trials in Four U.S. States.”  Princeton University, unpublished
manuscript.
Bloom, Howard, Saul Schwartz, Susanna Lui-Gurr, Suk-Won Lee, Wendy
Bancroft, and Jason Peng.  1999.  Testing a Re-Employment Incentive for
Displaced Workers: The Earnings Supplement Project.  Ottawa: Social
Research and Demonstration Corporation.
Council of Economic Advisers.  1999.  Economic Report of the President.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Eberts, Randall W., and Christopher J.  O’Leary.  1996.  “Profiling Unemploy-
ment Insurance Beneficiaries.”  Employment Research 3(2): 1, 3–4.  W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, Michigan.
Feldstein, Martin, and David Altman.  1998.  “Unemployment Insurance Sav-
ings Accounts.”  Working paper no. 6860, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
274 Robins
Johnson, Terry R., and Daniel H.  Klepinger.  1994.  “Experimental Evidence
on Unemployment Insurance Work-Search Policies.”  Journal of Human
Resources 29(3):  695–717.
Lauzon, Darren.  1995.  Worker Displacement—Trends, Characteristics, and
Policy Responses.  Ottawa, Canada: Human Resources Development Can-
ada.
Linkz, Donna.  1999.  “The Unemployment Insurance Bonus Experiments.”
Unpublished manuscript, Catonsville Community College, Baltimore,
Maryland.
Meyer, Bruce D.  1995.  “Lessons from the U.S. Unemployment Insurance
Experiments.”  Journal of Economic Literature 3 (1): 93 –131.
O’Leary, Christopher J., Paul Decker, and Stephen Wandner.  1997. “Reem-
ployment Bonuses and Profiling.”  Working paper no. 98-051, W.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, Michigan.
OECD.  1990.  Labor Market Policies for the 1990s.  Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, Paris, France.
Ross, Murray N., and Ralph E. Smith.  1993.  Displaced Workers: Trends in
the 1980s and Implications for the Future.  Washington, D.C.: U.S. Con-
gressional Budget Office.
United States Department of Labor.  1989.  The New Jersey Unemployment
Insurance Reemployment Demonstration Project. Unemployment Insur-







Evidence from Three Field Experiments
 




W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
 
Reemployment bonuses in the unemployment insurance system : evidence from three 
field experiments / Philip K. Robins and Robert G. Spiegelman, editors.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0–88099–225–5 (pbk. : alk. paper)—ISBN 0–88099–226–3 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Insurance, Unemployment—United States—States—Case studies.  2. Welfare
recipients—United States—States—Case studies.  3. Bonus system—United
States—States—Case studies.  4. Insurance, Unemployment—Illinois.  5. Insurance,
Unemployment—Pennsylvania.  6. Insurance, Unemployment—Washington (State).




© 2001 by the
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007–4686
All rights reserved.
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are
the sole responsibility of the authors.  They do not necessarily represent positions of
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by J.R. Underhill.
Index prepared by Leoni Z. McVey.
Printed in the United States of America.
01 02 03 04 05 06 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
